The 2013 trade deadline came and went.  The Jazz front office chose to stand pat and made no moves, a decision that immediately drew the ire of many fans who hopefully eyed the trade deadline as an opportunity for the Jazz to definitively declare their intentions.  Utah’s failure to make the postseason further stoked the flames of discontent among the Utah faithful, who watched Ty Corbin eschew giving young players such as Enes Kanter, Derrick Favors and Alec Burks more valuable playing time in favor of playing team vets Paul Millsap, Al Jefferson and Randy Foye; none of whom may be with the team next season.

Utah’s failure to qualify for the postseason via the “win now” method of giving the lion’s share of minutes to vets, combined with the increasingly likely departures of Jefferson and Millsap, seem to outline long-term plan for the Jazz of going young, for better or worse.

The move makes complete sense for a number of reasons.  The roster as it’s currently constructed has a relatively low ceiling, one it probably came pretty close to hitting last year.  While Utah’s roster is a borderline-playoff team at best, the rest of the West seems to only be getting tougher, with the Rockets and Clippers both looking to acquire an additional superstar and compete immediately for a title.  With the so-called “Core Four” pining for developmentally crucial minutes, and without the immediate ability to be a competitive team in the West (barring a major, unforeseen blockbuster trade), why not take this season and possibly next to let the future of your team log valuable minutes against first-tier NBA talent?  The Jazz will also likely have 2-3 fresh-faced rookies on the team after the NBA Draft, and the team will have no more opportune time to give them significant in-game experience to go along with their menial tasks and Hello Kitty backpacks.

Speaking of drafts, I hear the 2014 NBA Draft is shaping up to be a pretty good one.  Canadian wunderkind Andrew Wiggins and LDS Chicago-area standout and future Duke Blue Devil Jabari Parker are just a few of the highly touted prospects the ’14 draft will have to offer.  A rebuilding year would likely mean a relatively poor record for the Jazz and subsequent high draft choice in the loaded ’14 draft.

With the alluring proposition of nabbing a Wiggns or a Parker comes the ugly by-product that seems to be requisite of a successful rebuilding season.

Losing.  Lots and lots of losing.

It’s great to focus on the positives of a given situation, but the terrible record that goes hand in hand with turning the team over to a relatively inexperienced group of up-and-comers is easy to overlook, and it’s something Jazz fans who are clamoring for the youth movement may be understating and/or overlooking.

Is a fan base that has only been subjected to two losing seasons since 1984 really prepared mentally to deal with a losing season?  Will a legion of fans so spoiled by success be able to maintain interest and support if the team is nowhere near playoff contention by January?  As bitter a taste a single loss can leave, I’m not if the bulk of Jazz fans are prepared to suffer through defeat after defeat and still stay happily engaged and supportive of the team.

It’s certainly not out of the realm of possibility that Jazz will fans will be much more patient, supportive and understanding than expected.  Maybe my concerns are wholly unfounded.  I certainly hope that’s the case.  I’m afraid it’s not. While the youth movement appears on the surface to be the most logical, there is one huge financial variable that could throw a wrench in rebuilding plans: enough flexibility to make a contortionist jealous.

The primary reason Jazz GM Dennis Lindsey gave for not making a move on the trade deadline was the maintenance of Utah’s salary cap flexibility.  As great an asset as it is to have, this cap flexibility makes it impossible to get a read on how or when it will be used.  The “how” is just as befuddling as the “when.”  Obviously, the oodles of cap room gives the Jazz the option of signing a free agent outright.  If Utah can convince a potential All-Star-caliber free agent to take his talents to the land of green Jell-o and weak beer, the option of foregoing the rebuilding process becomes much more desirable.  Utah’s less-than-elite status as a potential free agent destination makes the acquisition of a big name via trade a more likely scenario.  Utah could use the extra cap space to acquire a player in exchange for taking on additional undesirable contracts rather than having to part with young talent alone, leaving a more complete team intact for the newly-acquired star to play alongside.

Regardless of the course the Jazz choose, one thing is certain: the Utah Jazz roster is primed for a complete makeover.

This photo, courtesy the Jazz, shows mockups of the new Jumbotron. The upper photo shows the size of the sideline video board, while the bottom shows the size of the endline video board. The actual current Jumbotron is shown, middle.

The Utah Jazz just announced a new $15 million dollar upgrade to Energy Solutions Arena, in the form of a massive video board and new audio system. The project, done by local Utah company YESCO, is scheduled to be finished in late September. Fans attending the Jazz’s draft party next Thursday will see these mockups to indicate the final size of the side boards: 42 feet long by 24 feet high. The scoreboards will also be at 1080p resolution, the old Jazz scoreboard was lit by individual bulbs and was literally at this resolution:

There will also be scoreboards containing information in the upper bowl corners, as indicated in this mockup (the court, however, will not feature mountains nor the mountain logo):

More specifications and details can be found in the Jazz’s release on UtahJazz.com. More mockups below:

Personal feelings on the issue: OMG THAT IS SO HUGE! WOW WOW WOW IT IS LITERALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR ME TO IMAGINE HAVING SCREENS THAT LARGE AS I WATCH A JAZZ GAME I AM ALSO ATTENDING. IT IS UNIMAGINABLE. AND STATS FOR THE UPPER BOWL CITIZENS LIKE MYSELF TOO? AND THREE VIDEO RINGS FOR SOME REASON? I HAPPILY WILL GIVE MY MONEY TO YOU, JAZZ, OVER THE COURSE OF 82 GAMES. HAPPILY.

They ranked 22nd in the NBA in defensive efficiency, the accepted measure. They allowed 104.3 pts per 100 possessions. No team worse than the Jazz at giving up points made the playoffs, while 12 of the 13 top teams in defensive efficiency did. (The outlier, oddly, were the Wizards, who finished 7th best on defense, behind Indiana, Memphis, San Antonio, Oklahoma City, Chicago, Boston and Miami — the league’s cream of the crop.)

As the Jazz approach the offseason, they must focus hard on a single objective: Improving their defense, Yes, some of their worst defenders (Howdy, Big Al) may leave, but at least half the roster and their head coach remains.

Thus, taking a close look at where the Jazz went wrong — how it is they gave up so many points — is critical for understanding what they need to do next, whether that’s bringing in the right players via the draft or free agency, the current coaching staff changing their focus, or bringing in a new coach or coaches.

However they get there, you can’t fix what went wrong until you know what broke.

Let’s start with some basic data, available on NBA.com. We can look at “zone” data: where the team gave up shots, and how well their opponents fared. It’s fruitful to both look at volume — whether the Jazz give up more shots from certain distances than other teams — and success.

Before we check out the numbers, let’s review what defensive-minded NBA analysts — and the league’s smarter teams — have concluded. Teams that play top defense need to either prevent teams from taking the most efficient shots — free throws, field goals within the restricted circle and corner 3s —  or to force them to shoot poorly from those distances.

Bad defensive teams tend to allow teams to take oodles of the best shots, and/or to hit a high percentage of them. The best defensive teams force teams to the least efficient shots, namely long 2s and midrange jumpers.

To the data:

What can we learn from the data? Where are the Jazz poorest?

• They foul way too much. Only six teams put their opponents on the appropriately-named charity stripe more than the Jazz. As longtime Jazz watchers know, this has been a problem for many years.
• Jazz opponents hit corner 3s — one of the game’s most efficient shots — at a rate higher than any other team’s opponents.
• The Jazz rarely force opponents to settle for long jumpers, the game’s least efficient shot.
• The Jazz allow a fairly high number of shots within the restricted area: dunks, layups and other very short field goal attempts.
• The Jazz gave up a higher than average proportion of offensive rebounds, opportunities which tend to lead to easier shots.

Where did the 2012-13 Jazz tend to do better than average on defense?

• While their opponents took many efficient, close shots, they didn’t shoot all that well from point blank range.
• While the Jazz allowed their opponents to shoot 3s at a very high rate, they didn’t allow them to take all that many such shots, limiting the damage from long-range.

It’s clear what the Jazz need to improve at: They need to foul less and to give up fewer shots from close range. They need to make it tougher for their opponents to hit corner 3s at a high rate. And they need to force opposing shooters into mid-range jumpers.

How? That’s a much trickier question. Clearly, a change in personnel would help: Most Jazz fans would guess that if Derrick Favors plays more minutes, opponents will be more likely to shy away from going to the rim. More minutes for the imposing Enes Kanter would likely also help in the paint, as would the departures of the under-sized and foul-prone Paul Millsap and the slow-footed Al Jefferson. A young point guard might fight off penetration more easily.

But several of those troubling indicators suggest the Jazz problem is also one of scheme — of coaching. Players can clearly be taught to foul less. They can be coached to not leave shooters open for easy corner 3s. They can be told to try and force the other team into 20-foot jumpers. Athleticism and makeup impact these traits, too, but coaching is a huge influence.

Perhaps the most critical national writing on the 2012-13 Jazz and their coaching staff came from Grantland’s Zach Lowe, who covered the team in March and had the following harsh words (even as he called the young, talented and cap-space-rich Jazz “the most interesting franchise in the league right now”):

There’s also the fact that Utah’s defense plays with a weird lack of discipline and unclear, unproductive rules. That’s partly on Corbin…There are no clear, consistent rules to Utah’s defense…The Jazz’s inability to contain pick-and-roll ball handlers opens up shots everywhere — in the lane, from the corners, and from elsewhere around the arc. Utah opponents get a lot of the highest-value shots in the game. The Jazz have a weird tendency to rotate off shooters in the corners nearest the ball handler — a huge no-no on smarter teams.

Lowe makes clear that those flaws are only partly the coach’s fault. Some of the blame, perhaps even most, lies with their inexperienced youngsters making mistakes and their unathletic vets being simply too slow.

Big problems. Both with the players — and how they’re coached. Problems that must be addressed.

In my next look at defense, I’ll drill down into the data for specific players: Is it only those Jazzmen who are likely on their way out the door who fouled too much and allowed too many layups and open 3s? Which players show the most promise on defense?

To be continued…..

For the teams I looked at (Utah, Boston, Chicago, Indiana, Memphis, Orlando, and San Antonio), a team’s defensive ranking increased dramatically in a defensive-minded coach’s second full year, with Tom Thibodeau being the exception: the Bulls were 10^th defensively the year before he started coaching, and they were 1^st defensively in his first year as a coach.

For example, Frank Vogel took over head-coaching duties for the Indiana Pacers in January 2011. The Pacers were ranked 12^th defensively in 2010-2011 and were 15^th the year prior. In 2011-2012—Vogel’s first full season as a head coach—they were ranked 10^th defensively. Where Indiana made the leap to the elite defensive team in the league was during Vogel’s second full season as a head coach, the 2012-2013 season. The chart below shows Indiana’s progression defensively, with Vogel’s second full season as head coach highlighted (note: each highlighted box in the charts represents the coach’s second full year).

Folks might reason that Indiana’s admission to the elite defensive teams club was because of Roy Hibbert’s increased playing time, but his playing time actually decreased this past season (though Paul George’s did increase by nearly eight minutes per game).

Memphis is another case that supports the Second-Year Theory. Lionel Hollins started coaching Memphis in 2009, and their defensive ranking for the 2009-2010 season was 23; it was 20 in the year prior. However, in his second season as the head coach of the Grizzlies, they jumped to 8^th.

The Orlando case is interesting because they already had a top defensive player in Dwight Howard, but didn’t have a top defensive team until Stan Van Gundy came along. Howard was a rookie in the 2004-2005 season, playing over 32 minutes per game, and the Magic ranked 18^th defensively. Van Gundy started coaching and they ranked 11^th during the 2007-2008 season. Again, the dramatic jump happened in Van Gundy’s second year–once again supporting the Two-Year Theory–2008-2009, when the Magic were 1^st defensively, and they remained at or near the top for several years.

Chicago is a unique case because Thibodeau was able to transform his team immediately, as the Bulls went from a 10^th-ranked defensive team the year before he started coaching in 2009-2010, to the top defensive team with Thibodeau in 2010-2011. This is where understanding Thibodeau’s background as a defensive coach in Houston (top 5 in league scoring defense and field goal percentage defense from 2004-2007) and Boston (top rating in several defensive categories in 2007-2008) helps give context.

Boston is an interesting case where the coach didn’t have a great influence defensively, but Kevin Garnett did:

Unfortunately, Hollinger’s stats don’t reach as far back as when Poppovich started with San Antonio, but we can still see that San Antonio has been an elite defensive team for the last decade. Yes, they’ve had Tim Duncan manning the middle, but Pop’s adjustment of increased minutes for Splitter helped the Spurs jump back into the Top 3 defensively this last season.

What does this mean for Jazz fans? Considering the Jazz have been ranked in the 20’s defensively for the last three years, I think it’s safe to say that Corbin is not an elite defensive-minded coach. You could argue that’s because Jefferson has been manning the middle, but Thibodeau had Boozer and found a way to compensate by playing Noah as much as he could. I would counter that this is part of why Favors and Kanter should have gotten more minutes, especially last year.

Since the Jazz now have some defensive-minded players in Favors, Kanter, Hayward, and Burks, and they may actually get a significant jump in playing time this year, we have a chance to be a much stronger defensive team. As Locke has mentioned quite a few times, the top three defensive teams in the league made the Conference Finals. And the fourth team was a Top 10 defensive team with the best player in the league.

Point being: Because the Jazz don’t have a defensive-minded head coach, they should make sure to bring in an assistant who is specializes in defense for the vacant assistant coach position. (I was hoping Mike Budenholzer would be available as a head coach when Corbin’s contract expired, but that’s not going to happen now, unfortunately). Thibodeau was an assistant in Houston and worked his defensive magic there, so if the Jazz could find some sort of equivalent in this situation, the Utah defense would be in much better shape.

46: The spot he was drafted in 2009 by the Cavaliers.

115: The number of minutes he played in 20 games during his rookie campaign.

0: The number of minutes he played in the 2010 playoffs with Cleveland. The Cavaliers lost 4-2 vs the Celtics in the Conference Semifinals.

8: The number of regular season games he played in his first season with the Spurs in 2010-11.

66: The number of games he played in the next season with the Spurs (every game considering it was a shortened season). He started 38.

80: The number of games and starts in 2012-13.

115: The number of 3-pt field goals made in his first three NBA seasons combined

177: The number of 3-point field goals made this season, ranked 8^th in the NBA.

47: The number of 3-point field goals made this postseason, which leads all players.

18: The number of playoff games he started for the Spurs in 2013.

32: The number of minutes he has played per game in the Finals vs former teammate LeBron James.

The path to greatness is often cloaked in rejection. Green’s NBA career, after four seasons at UNC, has been defined by the consistent need to prove himself in a game that is as much about opportunity as it is talent.

He spent time in the D-League. He was waived. And waived again. Talent without opportunity is just a promise, often unfulfilled. Green’s opportunities would come, and he stayed ready.

In Game 3 of the NBA Finals, with the series tied 1-1, he erupted for 27 points to lead all scorers. He shot nine of 15 from the field, including seven of nine from beyond the arc. LeBron James, the teammate Green once cheered on from the bench and scrimmaged against in practice, was limited to 15 points in the loss. While it is certainly not a James vs Green matchup or comparison, there is an element of irony in the Finals face-off. For James, the four-time MVP and 2012 Finals MVP, this stage has been expected, if not almost predestined. For Green, a place in the league seemed like a long shot at times. He could have won a championship with the Cavaliers as an afterthought. With the Spurs, he is integral.

In the postgame press conference, Green reflected on his childhood days as a fan watching playoff games and press conferences.  “I watched hundreds of them…I never thought I’d be up here talking to you guys now,” he said.

Asked by a reporter if he thought he would ever be in a position to outscore former teammate LeBron James in an NBA Finals game, Green responded, “No. Never thought in a million years that would happen.”

While the numbers don’t define Green, they represent the tangible evidence of an ongoing journey. Many players face similar obstacles, as the road ahead is filled with the uncertainty of whether opportunity will ever be afforded and talent will ever be realized. The only constant that connects journeymen–players of different ilk looking for their shot, their chance to prove they deserve a place–is that good things can only happen if one stays ready for them.

If that doesn’t give you crazy 90’s flashbacks, I don’t know what will.

That realization, however, led to another. As I reflected on the glory days of Jazz basketball, I began to feel a large void. One that has compounded over years of frustration and anguish. 15 years to be precise.

June 14. This date has special significance in Utah Jazz lore. Any ideas why?

It’s been 15 years to the date since the Jazz last played basketball in June. 15 years to the date since the Jazz have had practically any relevancy in the NBA. 15 years to the date since Jordan cemented his legacy by pushing off Bryon Russell.

June 14, 1998 — Game 6 of the 1998 NBA finals.

That’s what made this realization so painful. If your Friday was anything like mine, it’s now ruined. Sure the playoffs are great, but it’s always more fun with the Jazz involved. Same goes for the NBA finals. This is sure to be a memorable finals, but nothing even compares to the playoff runs in 97-98.

That was the year for the Jazz. The Bulls had their number the year before, but this was their shot at redemption. The chance for John and Karl to finally get that elusive ring.

But alas. (Only watch this video if you’re in a good place emotionally)

Surely, with MJ “retiring” at the end of that season, the crown would be vacated. Seemingly Utah’s for the taking. Right?

Then came the lockout shortened season of 1998-99, and the Jazz nestled into the twilight years of our superstars. Never quite able to get back over the hump and into June.

That’s right, the Jazz have never played a single game in June since that cold, dark summer day. Not with Stockton and Malone. Not even during the surprising run to the Western Conference Finals with Deron/Boozer in 2007. Game 5 (Utah was eliminated 4-1 by San Antonio in that series) took place on May 30.

So close.

June hasn’t been basketball season in Utah for a decade and a half. It is now just the month in between Jazz-playoff-elimination month and pioneer-day month.

One day, let us hope that the Jazz will again return to prominence. This time, MJ won’t be there to stop us. (Hopefully not Lebron, either)

And when they get there, maybe, just maybe, NBA broadcast rights will have shifted as well, and the NBC Ode to Joy will be there to greet us.

How’s that for playoff nostalgia?

To date, James is 8-13 in the NBA Finals, a .380 winning percentage. Not what one expects of a four-time League MVP; certainly not what one expects of a player who, at only 28 years old, increasingly gets mention in the possible greatest-player-of-all-time discussion.

Karl Malone would certainly love to be in James’s place, though. Two finals coming up short (and a third on the way, I suspect) must be easier to stomach with one ring already on the finger. That ring is the single biggest difference between the legacy of Malone and James, though Malone must also content himself with heading the best-at-his-position debate rather than the best-player-ever discussion.

James is a better player than Malone ever was. I think that point is unarguable. What may be much more debatable is that James has clearly proven himself better on the greatest of stages. But looking at their Finals numbers, that simply isn’t true.  (Statistics are accurate as of game 3 from this year’s series.)

In his two Finals appearances against the Bulls (arguably a better team than any James has ever faced), Malone averaged more points and rebounds per game on a superior field goal percentage than James. James has posted the better percentage from the line, but he compromises that efficiency by chucking more than four threes a game while making only one. Both have admirable assist totals for their positions, but Malone’s defensive stats are better across the board.

Which player would you rather lead you into the championship round, assuming they continued to produce exactly the above statistics?  It’s largely a wash. All things considered, the numbers probably show Malone in a slightly better light given the defensive statistics. Even his winning percentage of .333 projects as practically identical to LeBron’s .380: each suggest your guy will only get you two wins in the series before you watch the confetti fall on your opponent.

Contrast both players to Michael Jordan (the guy who really does deserve to head the list in that greatest-of-all-time discussion).  Ten points or more better than these alternatives on superior shooting from all areas of the floor while chipping in six rebounds and six assists a game as well. Yeah, I’ll take that guy.

It’s sad, but Karl Malone’s Finals legacy is one of disappointment, if only because of the supreme standard he set as to his own performance, throughout his career and those seasons in particular. He wasn’t as good as we thought he could be and needed to be to earn that ring.  But how much of that legacy is due to his playing slightly less than his best against arguably the greatest basketball team ever assembled? How different would that legacy be if, instead of Jordan’s Bulls, Malone put up 24, 10, and 3 against the Oklahoma City Thunder, an extremely young team that folded under the pressure of the championship round against Miami and who might have done the same against Utah?

What if Malone had that ring without playing any better than he did?

Who knows. What I do know is that LeBron James has not been a better player than Karl Malone in the NBA Finals. So perhaps we should revisit our perception of a few legacies here. Karl Malone may not have shrunk under championship strain as much as some believe, while LeBron James is showing himself far, far from nearing a coronation as Greatest Ever, not as judged by the crucible of the NBA Finals.

So what are they fitting into? Before we figure out what the Jazz are turning into, let’s think twice about what they are today. I think there are some common misconceptions about the Jazz’s current style of play that are so rooted, they’re often repeated even by players and coaches. Specifically, it’s time to reevaluate the knee-jerk perception that the Jazz are an inside-out team.

For years, Utah was near the top of the league in attempts at the rim, so it became pretty easy to associate Jazz basketball with a lay-up line — even though that might not be the case anymore.

The reality, for better or worse, is that the Jazz have become a very jumper-reliant team. That’s not meant to sound like a criticism; maybe it was a strategic decision to create fissures in the defense by stretching the floor. But whether on purpose or not, the Jazz are less of the “inside-out” team the world is used to. And it’s not a new trend that developed after the addition of several shooting specialists to the roster, or even the head coaching change of February 2011.

Source: 82games.com

In the era of Deron Williams, Carlos Boozer and Memo Okur — all good jump shooters at their respective positions — the Jazz relied on jumpers primarily as a mechanism to open up the middle. In the three full seasons leading up to the free agent shuffle of 2010, jumpers accounted for less than 61% of their shots. That is an extremely effective philosophy, and few teams managed to generate such a huge chunk of their attempts (39%) on what 82games.com calls “close” shots, dunks or tips. As a result, they were one of the better shooting teams in the league, with eFG numbers above .520.

The shift to the outside began even under the Williams and Jerry Sloan regime. In the 2010-11 season, 69% of Utah’s shots were jumpers. That percentage held again in 2011-12, but this past season the jump shot was used for 71% of the team’s attempts, the sixth-highest chunk of jumpers in the league. Consequently, overall eFG% dropped below .500 those three years.

Going from 60-61% of your shots to 69-71% is a huge leap, and it happened almost overnight — at least over the course of one summer. The Jazz ended 2009-10 as the least jumper-happy team in the league, and came back a few months later with itchy trigger fingers. Their coach was the same and their point guard was the same. In fact, four of their top five minute getters that year were back from the previous season, and the lone newcomer in the bunch happens to be one of the game’s premier low block scorers.

Which raises the question: are Al Jefferson’s Jazz using the post to generate close shots, or are they using it as a decoy to free up shooters? It seems ironic that you would add one of the game’s best post men and then shift your offensive forcefully to the outside, but that’s what happened, and the only way to explain it is that the Jazz have been using Al to play, oddly enough, outside-in.

That, in fact, is precisely how Gordon Hayward framed the shift when I asked him about it around mid-season. The team was actually 73% jumper-reliant at that point, so for a while it was a topic I would ask different guys to chime in on. Several guys just repeated the old adage: “We’re an inside-out team.” The young swingman’s assessment was probably more realistic.

“We’ve got a lot of good shooters on this team,” Hawyard said, “so if teams key in on our post guys, we can hopefully knock shots down.” That is 100% sound basketball thinking, but different from saying that the team primarily operates inside-out.

Again, don’t confuse this for a criticism. Being a jump-shooting team isn’t even a bad thing. The current NBA Finalists reached this point while spending 67% (Spurs) and 70% (Heat) of their shots on jumpers, so if you can knock them down, it can be a recipe for success. But the old Jazz philosophy seemed to be to use shooters to create space inside, which is different from the apparent new model of using post players to create room for shooters.

Point guard Earl Watson was a bit more prescriptive when I talked to him about the increase in outside shots. “We can’t just rely on jumpers. We’ve got a very athletic team, so we should be able to get to the rim more.”

Perhaps that’s the shift Ty Corbin and others are mulling. Perhaps it’s something more tactical, like in 2003-04 when Sloan and his staff tweaked the guard line to alleviate some of the pressure on the point guard position. Either way, it’s worth noting that an offensive transformation already happened, albeit sneakily, in 2010. Whatever Corbin has cooking will be off of that baseline, not an old Jazz system that got two fifths of its shots in close.

Of course, if 2010 was a turning point for the franchise, 2013 could prove to be a completely new direction. Regardless of what happened in the Williams/Boozer days or over the last three years, the Jazz could come back playing inside-out, outside-in, upside-down or all of the above. It will be a fascinating summer of intriguing personnel decisions, and then we’ll finally see in October exactly what kind of system the new-era Jazz have built.

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Utah has been thorough and exhaustive in their draft preparations. As SLC Dunk’s excellent coverage detailed, the Jazz had perhaps the largest contingency present at last month’s NBA Draft Combine (including one Jerry Sloan). They were active there, interviewing a number of prospects. At last count, Utah has already had 26 individuals (20 just last week) in for pre-draft workouts with two more slated for Wednesday (including perhaps the highest ranked player to date, guard C.J. McCollum). Jazz brass also took in Eurocamp to analyze some international talent and also attended large group workouts sponsored by other teams, involving mostly second-round talent or fringe talent. Add in the untold hours Utah’s scouting staff has spent over the past months and even years, and the Jazz should be ready two weeks from now.

Like many of you, I frequent the various NBA mock drafts. It always is interesting to see how different the various predictions can be. There are some sources that are more reputable than others, but all in all, it is indeed an inexact activity. While you cannot always put stock into what is being said, it is still enjoyable to see what the national media prognosticates.

I thought it might be helpful to compile the various mocks into one place for Salt City Hoops readers’ convenience. Besides the links, I’ll also add some thoughts regarding the players each site has listed for the Utah Jazz.

Draft Express Mock Draft, updated 06.11

Thanks to their extensive player profiles, videos, and breakdowns, Draft Express is one of the best sources around. This go-around has the Jazz taking point guard Shane Larkin at #14, shooting guard Jamaal Franklin at #21, and a tall fellow named Marko Todorovic at #46.

It’s no secret that the point guard position is a priority, and Larkin is a guy whose stock seems to be rising. Originally thought to be a late first-rounder, many now peg him as a potential lottery pick. He is quick, athletic, and demonstrated proficiency running the pick-and-roll, a big plus for the Jazz system. Yes, his size (5’11″) is a natural concern, but if a guy can play, that can be negated. Larkin also exudes leadership.

Jamaal Franklin is all over the place in the various mocks. He played a lot of forward at San Diego State, but figures to be a shooting guard at the NBA level. His shooting is a work-in-progress, but he brings elite rebounding to the table (9.4 rpg in 33.2 mpg). And as is mentioned often, rebounding is one skill that translates well in the transition to the pros.

ESPN.com Mock Draft 4.0 (Insider), updated 06.04

Chad Ford is a personal favorite of mine, as he sat down with me once to discuss the Utah Jazz. He also is well-connected, so his insights are very valuable. (He shared with me his backbreaking schedule as a university professor and ESPN Insider. He wakes up early to take in hours of basketball, as he lives in Hawaii, before heading to a full day of teaching, as well as regular international travel). This version of Chad’s mock draft has the Jazz going with everyone’s international man of intrigue, Dennis Schroeder at #14 and Kelly Olynyk at #21.

Schroeder remains an enigma to me. I know he has a lot of fans clamoring to see him in a Jazz jersey. He has some tantalizing aspects to his game, namely his speed, his quick step to the basket, and his wingspan (6’7”). He likens himself to Rajon Rondo, which can be a great thing, as well as a not-so-great one. By several accounts, his workouts have been underwhelming, and he may not have faced the toughest of competition over the years. That said, he has a lot of upside, perhaps the most of the point guard crop.

Olynyk comes from John Stockton country (Gonzaga) and is as polished a scorer as there is in the draft. He offers an array of moves and could be a fine complement to the Jazz bigs as a stretch four or a pick-and-pop guy. I like him a lot. Now, the hair is an entirely different story.

CBS Sports Mock Draft, updated 06.11

In a two-for-one fashion, Matt Moore and Gary Parrish share their own picks. Moore has Utah taking Mason Plumlee and Allen Crabbe, while Parrish opts for Larkin and center Steven Adams.

Plumlee is another solid Duke big with some nice numbers (17.1 ppg, 60% FGs, 9.9 rpg). He showed well athletically at the Combine and should enjoy a long NBA career. Crabbe has good size, can rebound, and is a shooter. His athleticism is average. Ford mentioned Tuesday that he will work-out for the Jazz soon. Most see him as a late first-round pick.

Adams, who worked out for the Jazz last week, has also been rising in some mocks. Some see him as a late lottery guy. He is a true center whose forte is on the defensive end of things. His offensive game is very raw and his free throw shooting very poor (44%). His interviews were engaging, as his personality really came out.

Hoopshype.com Mock Draft, updated 06.10

This mock predicts the Jazz going with Larkin at #14 and Rudy Gobert of France at #21. Gobert’s main strength is his size. At 7’0”, he sports a 7’8” wingspan and 9’7” standing reach. His mere presence could have an effect on defense. He too is limited offensively, but made the most of his few attempts (72% FGs). He is a project.

Hoopsworld.com Mock Draft, updated 06.09

Hoopsworld has Shabazz Muhammad falling to the Jazz at #14 and Schroeder going #21. Muhammad was considered a mid-lottery pick thanks to his scoring prowess, but has been slipping the past few weeks. He was among the few potential high picks who actually worked out at the Combine. Muhammad has some off-court concerns, but if he is available, the Jazz would have to consider the talent to pick ratio. He does not have quite the preferred height for a small forward and his handle is not refined for a shooting guard – a tweener of sorts. Ford said he too will work-out for Utah. Jazz executives, per SLC Dunk, spent a lot of time visiting with him at the Combine. Schroder at #21 would be a great pick.

NBA Draft.net Mock Draft, updated 06.09

This mirrors Hoopshype’s mock, listing Larkin and Gobert as being the Jazz’s targets. They do have point guard Pierre Jackson at #46. He would be an absolute steal that low in the Draft and he could have a nice career as a back-up point guard. He plays with a lot of heart. But if Utah did go with Larkin and Jackson, the Jazz would feature two sub-6’ point guards.

Sports Illustrated Mock Draft 2.0, updated 05.29                          

Another Larkin/Gobert pairing for Utah here, in a mock that has not been updated for a few weeks.

USA Today Mock Draft, updated 06.07

This one is very interesting. At #14, the Jazz take McCollum and at #21, Glen Rice Jr. I highly doubt that McCollum falls to #14, but stranger things have happened. He is more of a scorer than a facilitator, although he can do that. He showed a nice three-point stroke, but injuries derailed his season. If he fell to #14, it would be a no-brainer.

Rice’s story is a very different one than the rest of the Draft class. He had his fair share of troubles at Georgia Tech, where he played with Favors. He was eventually booted off the team and rather than transfer, he went to play in the D-League. After a very slow start, he took off toward the end of the season and was the catalyst in leading his team to the league championship (29 ppg, 11.5 rpg, 4 apg, 3 spg, 3 rpg). He can score. And it’s not worth much at all, but his father was a Jazzman for a few days thank to the John Amaechi trade (a salary-absorbing move to pick up an asset, something we might see this year with the team’s massive financial flexibility).

Sporting News Mock Draft, updated 06.10

Schroeder is Sporting News’ pick for the #14 (a week ago, Schroeder was the main prediction for most mocks. As you can see, he’s been replaced by Larkin as the favorite for the Jazz this week). At #21, they are going with Tim Hardaway Jr. (it seems like there are some good genes in this draft). Hardaway is a scorer whose shooting declined last season. He has decent size and inherited some of his father’s confidence.

That should do it for the mock draft circling of the wagons. I may have missed one or two out there, but these are the main ones. As you can tell, given the dynamics of a draft—lacking in star power, but strong in the middle—there are numerous options for the Jazz. While a point guard seems highly likely for at least one of the picks, with so many holes on the roster, Utah could go several different ways with the other pick(s). And as Dennis Lindsey has intimated, they could trade up, down, or out.

What do you think the team will do? Feel free to include your own predictions in the comments.

T-minus two weeks…

“I think I’m finished.”

With four simple words, John Stockton casually and unceremoniously closed the curtain on an historic NBA career.  In true Stockton style, calling no attention to himself, he made the announcement at locker cleanout day as offhandedly as he would answer a question about his previous night’s dinner choice.  The announcement, combined with the move made to L.A. by Karl Malone, the yin to Stockton’s yang, poignantly trumpeted the end of an incredible Utah Jazz era.

If losing two hall-of-fame players and the entire team’s identity in one offseason weren’t bad enough, Utah’s remaining roster was as underwhelming as they came.  The Sports Illustrated 2003-04 NBA season preview predicted the Jazz to finish dead last in the west, and quoted an anonymous scout from an opposing team, who was even less optimistic regarding Utah’s chances.

“If this team wins 20 games, I’ll be surprised,” the scout said.  “…This is probably the least talented club in the league.”

Utah’s opening night started lineup was comprised of 24-year-old Carlos Arroyo, who was attempting to fill the gargantuan shoes Stockton left behind at point guard; the overpaid and underwhelming Greg Ostertag at center and a talented but young Andrei Kirilenko playing out of position at power forward.  DeShawn Stevenson and Matt Harpring rounded out the starting lineup, with Raja Bell, Sasha Pavlovic, Jarron Collins, Ben Handlogten and Raul Lopez getting minutes off the bench.  The Jazz won that night, riding hot shooting (57%) and a balanced scoring effort to surprise many, even against an underwhelming Trail Blazers squad.  A 127-102 drubbing at the hands of the Dallas Mavericks in the next contest seemed to put the Jazz back on the path to futility and frequent losses where the rest of the league seemed to think they belonged.

Leave it to a team led by Jerry Sloan to grossly exceed expectations.

Despite the dearth of All-Star-caliber players and bona fide scorers on the roster, the Jazz continued to kick, scratch and claw their way through every game.  The hard-nosed, high energy style of play Sloan was known for during his playing days seemed to possess the team on a nightly basis.  Consistent effort and unselfish play led the Jazz to win more games than they lost, albeit in the least aesthetically pleasing manner possible.  By the end of 2003, the Jazz were sitting at a surprising 17-14 record and, shockingly enough, in the middle of the Western Conference playoff race.

If the lack of natural talent weren’t a big enough obstacle Utah had to sidestep, Matt Harpring suffered a knee injury in early January that sidelined him for the remainder of the season.  There are two incredible facts brought to light by this injury: the fact that Utah was a whisker away from making the playoffs after missing their second-best player for half the season, and the fact that Matt Harpring was the second-best player on a team with a winning record.  This is no knock on Harpring, as his aggressive play and perpetually revved up motor fit the Sloan system perfectly, but Harpring was nowhere near a franchise-level player.

Looking to take a flier on a once-prolific scorer and to acquire some much-needed three point shooting, Utah acquired Tom Gugliotta and Gordan Giricek in two separate draft deadline deals.  While the Gugliotta gamble never paid off, Giricek provided much of the scoring void left by Harpring’s knee injury and made Utah’s offense more dynamic by virtue of his three-point accuracy.

Through both draft day trades and sheer hustle and determination, Utah maintained its modest but above .500 pace.  Relying heavily on Kirilenko, Arroyo and Giricek, the Jazz continued to hover around the .500 mark until late in the season.  (Ironically, current Utah outcast Raja Bell was also a huge contributor to Utah’s offense, routinely pouring in 20 off the bench and garnering consideration for 6^th Man of the Year.)  At 42-38, Utah was ever so close to cracking that top eight in the Western Conference and extending their season for at least four more games.  Unfortunately, an expected loss to the Mavericks and an unexpected defeat to the terrible Phoenix Suns ended Utah’s season and playoff bid.  Most likely by virtue of missing the playoffs, Jerry Sloan lost out on winning Coach of the Year. The award went to Hubie Brown, who led the Grizzlies, in-his-prime Shane Battier and young stud Pau Gasol in tow, to 50-32 regular season record and the same number of playoff wins as Sloan’s Jazz squad, 0.

In addition everything mentioned previously, the following stats and facts from the 2003-04 Utah Jazz season only further magnify just how monumentally impressive a job Sloan did with this roster.  These don’t need to be sprinkled with prose or expounded upon; they speak for themselves.

• Ben Handlogten, a free agent with zero NBA experience who was signed a month before the season started, suffered a season-ending injury midway through the season.  It was considered a “major loss.”
• For the 2003-04 season, the Jazz had the third-hardest schedule, according to basketball-reference.com
• In 2003-04, every team in the Midwest Division went to the playoffs, except the Jazz.
• Had the Jazz been in the Eastern Conference, they would have been the 4^th seed.
• The 2003-04 Jazz were the fourth-youngest team in the league, with an average age of 24.9 years.
• At +5, the Jazz had the biggest positive differential in the NBA between wins (42) and expected wins (37), according to basketball-reference.com

In the annals of sports history, the 2003-04 Utah Jazz season will continue to go unnoticed and overlooked, overshadowed by the dawning of the LeBron James era, the triumph of the “star-less” Detroit Pistons over the star laden Los Angeles Lakers, and myriad other storylines.  Buried underneath all the focus on superstars old and new, against all odds, Jerry Sloan accomplished quite possibly his most impressive feat: wringing every lost drop of talent and effort out of a team that had no business even sniffing the playoffs, let alone nearly participating.  It’s a real shame Sloan doesn’t get more credit for this accomplishment.

But don’t expect him to say anything about it.