Salt City Hoops

NBA Finals Game 2 Notes and Observations

Andy Larsen — June 10, 2013 — 2 Comments

Even though the Miami Heat won Game 2 of this NBA Finals to put the series in a 1-1 deadlock, there’s still only about a week of basketball left to be played in the 2012-2013 season. While this isn’t Jazz-related, I wanted a chance to analyze some basketball on this site before the doldrums of the offseason begin. Here are some of my immediate notes and observations from last night’s pivotal Game 2 Heat win:

The Difference In Turnovers

Turnovers were a significant part of the story after Game 1: it was 4 Miami turnovers in the 4th that allowed San Antonio to go on the run that gave them the lead, and San Antonio’s game turnover total of 4 was incredibly impressive, especially given some of the passes being thrown by the Spurs. Indeed, out of the over 1000 games played this season, there were just 4 games in which teams had 4 turnovers or less.

In Sunday’s game, the story was instead about San Antonio’s carelessness with the ball, giving up 16 turnovers while Miami committed only 6. Most of San Antonio’s turnovers didn’t lead to transition opportunities for the Heat; per Synergy, Miami had just 2 more transition opportunities than in Game 1. Instead, the turnovers simply stymied the Spurs’ offense, limiting them to just 84 points.

Last season, there were 62 games in which one team had a turnover differential of 10 or more against their opponent, the turnover-happy teams were just 14-48 in such games (a 22% winning percentage). The Spurs weren’t winning Game 2 with an offensive performance like that.

Better Heat Traps on the Pick and Roll

How did San Antonio accrue 16 turnovers? Many of the mistakes were just sloppy basketball: Kawhi Leonard traveled on the first play of the game, Tony Parker dribbled it off of his foot uncharacteristically, Gary Neal had a pass go right through his hands and out of bounds, and Tim Duncan misread Manu Ginobili’s intentions on a inbounds play. These are focus turnovers, and the Spurs were disappointingly prone to these sorts of mistakes after their masterful Game 1.

However, Miami’s defense forced many of them too. In particular, it was a slightly different approach to the Tony Parker pick and roll that caused the Spurs initial frustration. In Game 1, Tony Parker and Manu Ginobili were very successful with the pocket pass (the bounce pass between the two defenders in the pick and roll) to their big men, Tiago Splitter and Tim Duncan, rolling towards the basket. In Game 2, however, Miami positioned its defenders slightly closer together, and had them focus on the pocket pass. The result: Tony Parker turnovers. Parker turned the ball over twice on consecutive forced pocket passes early in the 1st quarter:

See how Miami’s defenders stay close together, very much aware of blocking that pocket pass? The second turnover may even be a kicked ball, but it shows an awareness for this facet of the Spurs’ pick and roll game. From this point forward, the Spurs generally had to pass around, rather than through, Miami’s defenders on the pick and roll. This does two things: first, it generally gives the Spurs the ball in worse positions on the floor (Duncan at the top of the key rather than flashing towards the hoop), and second, it gives Miami an extra half-second or so to make the defensive rotation that it needs to prevent the layup or open three. The Spurs may well need to add a new wrinkle to their pick and roll game.

Miami’s PnR and Isolation Game

On the other side of the floor, Miami’s pick and roll and isolation game were dismal in Game 1. According to Synergy, San Antonio allowed just a 0.67 PPP on isolation plays, a 0.57 PPP on pick and roll plays in which the ball handler kept the ball, and just a 0.38 PPP on pick and roll plays for the roll man. You would certainly expect better numbers in the Isolation and Pick and Roll from a team with LeBron James, Dwyane Wade, and Chris Bosh.

As you’d expect, Miami was much better in Game 2, finishing with a 1 PPP in isolation, 0.95 for the PnR ball handler, and 1.43 PPP for the roll man. When watching the film, the reason for the difference seems to be one of patience: in Game 1, Miami often simply attacked with reckless abandon, trying to finish right over the Spurs’ defense. In Game 2, they had more patience to seek out the right play, often giving a beat to read the defense before attacking the vulnerability that the pick provided. Miami’s actually very good at reckless abandon, and so probably got somewhat unlucky in Game 1 in missing some shots they typically make. Luckily for them, this type of shot luck reverted to the mean in Game 2.

Mike Miller’s Renaissance

After the game, speaking over one of Sunday’s highlights in which LeBron kicks to an open Mike Miller for a three, NBATV analyst Dennis Scott said something along the lines of “And you know what Mike Miller’s motto is: ‘Let it fly!’”. Of course, it’s just a silly comment over a highlight video (and the current NBA studio analysts generally say some silly things at this point of the broadcast), but it shows just how much Mike Miller has changed over the past few seasons.

5 years ago, when playing for Minnesota, Timberwolves fans were incredibly frustrated at Mike Miller for his reluctance to shoot the ball. This is reasonable: Miller was making over 9 million dollars a year, and was a former NBA 6th man of the year precisely because he could shoot from the outside. Instead of taking advantage of the best aspect of his game, Miller sought to become a facilitator and playmaker, a decision which turned him from an above-average to a below-average player overnight. During his season with Minnesota, he shot just 3.4 threes per 36 minutes.

When Miller joined the Heat, things generally returned to normal: he shot 5.1 threes per 36 minutes, just as he had generally done in his early career with Memphis that brought him the recognition and money in the first place. This season, he’s even furthered that commitment, shooting 7.1 threes per 36 minutes in the regular season and playoffs. It’s been the best thing Miller could do for Miami’s offense, and his 3-3 performance last night helped in their big win. Miller’s motto change came just at the right time to help Miami.

In NBA mike miller, spurs turnovers, tony parker pick and roll

Anatomy of a Favorite Play

Laura Thompson — June 9, 2013 — 8 Comments

What are some of your favorite Jazz plays over the years? Do you have a Top 5? A Top 10?

My guess is you’ve got at least a few on the tip of your tongue (or fingertips, unless you’re talking to the computer screen right now…). I was trying to figure out if I could pick a Top Five Favorite Jazz plays; I’m stuck on four and might need some of your favorites to jog my memory to get to #5. Once I started sorting my favorites, I tried to put some thought and analysis into the WHY.

What makes a play great? The degree of difficulty of the play, the degree of effort, the other players involved, the significance of that play in the game (momentum, taking a lead, etc.), the significance of that game, the history-making potential, the defensive stops, the defense-to-offense plays, intentional or unintentional humor, unexpected reactions, etc.

Here’s my list:

1. The Shot

Is this the Numero Uno favorite for most Jazz fans out there? It’s called The Shot by many Jazz fans, and for good reason. The Shot was a history-making shot for the Jazz, sending them to the NBA Finals for the first time ever. It was a game-winning shot at the buzzer, so another check there. I consider Bill Walton’s “Uh oh” one of the fantastic moments of unintentional humor. The degree of difficulty on that shot is incredibly high; we’ve seen more star players miss clutch shots than make them, especially given that it was a three-point shot from feet behind the arc with so little time on the clock. As far as unexpected responses, Stockton usually remained stoic from tipoff to the final horn sounding, but seeing that amount of passion from him after the game was pretty remarkable. Seeing Bryon Russell jumping and bounding to Stockton as fast as he could was pretty great, too. Seeing Malone, Stockton, and Hornacek celebrate was something that may have brought a tear to my eye. The Shot endeared Stockton, even more, to Jazz fans forever.

2. The Pass

The shortest guy on the court got the rebound, took one dribble and, with one hand, whipped the ball to the other end of the court, just over the outstretched fingertips of Michael Jordan—A+ for degree of difficulty. Stockton’s pogo-stick-like jumping after his pass was pretty memorable, too, because he so rarely let his emotions show on the court. The fact that Stock threw the ball to Malone—the best big man at running the floor—made it that much better. The Mailman’s great hands made the finish on this one possible. I remember two snippets of interviews after the game: one with Michael Jordan and one with John Stockton. Michael Jordan said he thought he was going to be able to grab the pass, but Stockton had thrown it so perfectly that it just beyond where he could reach. Stockton’s interview was him saying something along the lines of “It was one of those ‘No, no, no . . . Yes!’” sort of plays (not to be confused with Scott Stevens’ great post yesterday).

The play was hugely significant in the game, putting the Jazz up 74-73 in the game, a lead they wouldn’t relinquish, and helped them win Game 4 to even the series 2-2.

3. The Block(s)

Gordon Hayward is becoming one of the kings of the chase-down block. This one, in particular, is awesome because he blocks the Celtics not just once, but twice (!), and then gets the fast break started on the other end, with Enes getting an and-one. Degree of difficulty? Top-notch. Degree of effort? Off the charts. Unintentional humor? Yes. Check out the look on Hayward’s face as he realizes he’s going back for block #2. Hayward made such a great defensive stop; I wish you could quantify how much you helped the team by not only keeping two points from being scored, but keeping the crowd out of it, and making sure the other team didn’t start a run. (Conversely, I wish you could quantify how much it helps the team when you make significant plays like this on your home floor and you get the crowd involved—any stats-minded folks know if there’s any way to figure that out?)

4. The Block and the Dunk

Because of its recency, this one is fresh in Jazz fans’ minds. During a preseason game against the Clippers, Jeremy Evans got the block on Ronnie Turiaf, took it the length of the floor, got HIGH above the rim for the dunk, and then beat all of his teammates back on D to deflect the Clippers’ pass. Degree of difficulty? Check. Degree of effort? Super check. Check out where Evans was when Turiaf caught the ball: he was under the basket (note: he was also a little off-balance when Turiaf got the ball, too). From there, Evans took two huge steps to get to Turiaf and, and Michael Smith pointed out in the broadcast, could have blocked the shot with his elbow because he got up so much air. Evans blocked the ball past the half-court line, took one dribble, took a couple of huge steps, and got a foot or two above the rim when he slammed it down.

What else was remarkable about this? All this was during a preseason game. What surprised me even more? I was at the game, and the crowd gave some serious props to Evans. Not bad for an opposing player in a preseason game!

5. Open to Suggestions.

Hayward’s chase-down block of CP3? One of Memo’s game-winners, perhaps the one against San Antonio in San Antonio? Another Stockton play? A Malone one? What are your favorites?

In Utah Jazz

No, No, No…Yes

Scott Stevens — June 7, 2013 — 10 Comments

As I sit and watch these Playoffs — with these 16 other teams not named the Utah Jazz — I can’t help but envy the rosters. Especially with the Heat and Spurs. It seems like 1-12, these guys each bring something unique and important to the table. An obvious, yet important, observation explaining why these teams are in the Finals, and the Jazz are not.

More than anything, I realized a small difference between Playoff rosters and the one we follow: I don’t cringe when these Finals players touch the ball. Also, I don’t cringe when these players actually shoot the ball. [Editor's note: I cringed when Chris Bosh shot that three-pointer at the end of Game 1 on Thursday.] There are far fewer “No, No, No… YES” players.

Help me rank this close-to-home list of NNN…Y players:

Earl Watson – I can’t think of another person whose jump shot makes me more nervous. To make it worse, he always seems to get caught with the ball at the end of the shot clock.

Jamaal Tinsley – The man is practically an And1 mixtape all on his own. But he never learned to put the ball in hoop. His set-shot “jumper” doesn’t exactly inspire confidence.

Mo Williams – Mo is known for being more of a shooter than a traditional point guard. He can get hot with the best of them, but might be the king of the ill-advised shot early in the shot clock.

*Sidenote – It’s never a good sign when all three of the Jazz point guards are at the top of this list.

Last but not least, Marvin Williams - I think his membership on this list boils down to the weird jump kick thingy he does with his legs.

It’s not just current Jazzmen, we’ve seen a number of “No, No, No… Yessers” in the past.

CJ Miles? Always high on the list.

Ronnie Price? Yeah, him too.

Ronnie Brewer? I still have nightmares of Kobe standing three feet off, daring him to take his crazy-form jump shots in the Playoffs.

But it hasn’t been all bad, either. We’ve also seen players like Kyle Korver and Jeff Hornacek, who had shots so pretty, it felt like every attempt was going in.

It’s also exciting and frustrating to face another team with a NNN…Y All-Star. Think of the Shawn Marions, Metta World Peaces and even Rajon Rondos of the league. I’ll let those guys take a jump shot any day — but it makes it sting even more when it actually goes in.

Give us your finest “No, No, No… Yes” players in the comments.

In Utah Jazz

The Cost of Moving Into the Top 10

Dan Clayton — June 6, 2013 — 11 Comments

When ping pong balls failed to put someone like Trey Burke or CJ McCollum within the Jazz’s draft reach, fans immediately started hoping for a June trade that would do so.

Not so fast.

The history of draft trades confirms how hard it is to get into the top 10, and doing so almost always requires giving up real assets. Combining later picks (like 14 & 21) doesn’t do the trick, so the only way the Jazz get a Burke/McCollum type of point guard is by giving up something of real value: one of their young core players or some of their cap space.

Don’t believe me? I scoured 10 years worth of draft history to analyze the economics of scoring an extra pick or moving up, and below are my findings, based on 53 past cases.

I included any trade where a team acquired a new 1^st round pick or moved up within the draft to obtain a first round pick, but only when the trade occurred immediately pre-draft or during the draft. I didn’t include player trades conducted throughout the year that also included picks. Different economics apply to picks in this situation as the supply & demand of a draft pick is completely different because teams’ motivations to deal are different at other points in the calendar.

For example, in February 2004 the Jazz scored a pick that would become the #9 in 2010 (Gordon Hayward) because they were willing to take on Tom Gugliotta’s contract in exchange for two guys whose salaries were being paid by insurance. No way that trade happens with a top 10 pick in June, so I left these kinds of trades out.

Here’s what I found out.

The Cost of Top Ten Picks

My first takeaway here is that top 10 picks don’t move very often leading up to draft day. There are only 13 examples in the last 10 drafts of a team trading up or in to land a top 10 spot. The other takeaway: doing so is costly. Multiple picks just doesn’t cut it.

Five of the 13 were teams already in the top 10 trading up to a more favorable spot, and even then they paid a premium to do so. For Charlotte to move up two spots from #4 to #2 in 2004, they had to throw in the #33 pick (valuable as you get fringe first-round talent without guaranteed money) and they had to agree to absorb Predrag Drobjnak in the expansion draft. Similar story for Memphis in 2008, moving from #5 to #3 for OJ Mayo only after they gave up three rotation players and absorbed loads of bad salary from Minnesota.

The other eight were all (to some degree) true rebuilding trades: deals where they gave up an All-Star or multiple starters in order to start over with young talent. For example, Seattle gave up on the Ray Allen era for a consolation prize of the #5 pick and two overpaid sub-stars in Wally Szczerbiak and Delonte West. Minnesota had to give up two starters AND take back three bad contracts to land the Ricky Rubio pick. There are many more trades like this one: give up a star or multiple starters, take back bad salary and a team MIGHT give you a 2-10 pick.

The one anomaly in this group was a 2004 trade that landed Luol Deng in Chicago. The Bulls only had to give the Suns a future protected pick, Jackson Vroman and $3 million in cash. A lot of history says that a future pick and an end-of-bench guy shouldn’t be enough to get you a top 10 pick. Maybe the cash did the trick for the Suns, who were paying their top 4 guys $49M for a lottery finish and would pursue Steve Nash that same summer.

In every other example, teams had to give up at least two of the following: a top 10 pick, capable players, or cap space to absorb bad salary.

The bad news for the Jazz is that it seems impossible to get into the top 10 without giving up one of the young guys AND sacrificing some cap space. So if you like Burke, you have to ask yourself if you like him more than Alec Burks or Enes Kanter, because that would almost certainly be part of the price tag.

Want more? I kept going in my study and also looked at the cost to acquire later first round picks. Check out today’s bonus content to see what picks in the teens and twenties usually cost a team on draft night.

In Draft

Bonus Content: Cost of Acquiring Picks

Dan Clayton — June 6, 2013 — 2 Comments

In today’s main post, Dan Clayton explores the economics behind trades involving top 10 picks and delivers bad news to Jazz fans who are pining for Trey Burke, et al. In this bonus post, his study continues with a glance at the cost of acquiring picks in the teens and twenties.

As a reminder for those who forgot since clicking from the other post, I scoured 10 years worth of draft history to analyze the economics of scoring an extra pick or moving up. We analyzed 13 of the 53 past cases in our post about top 10 picks, The findings, much to the chagrin of Jazz fans pining for the top guards like Trey Burke, Michael Carter-Williams or CJ McCollum, is that moving up into that range is pretty impossible without giving up a member of Utah’s young core.

The study of those 13 trades shows that you almost always have to surrender at least two of the following three assets to get a top 10 pick: a lower top 10 pick, a star or multiple starter-caliber players, or cap space to absorb bad salary. The Jazz don’t have a high enough pick to dangle as bait, so it would likely cost them both their use of financial flexibility and the willingness to surrender one of the four recent lottery picks on the team’s roster.

But there have been 40 more trades involving picks in the back two-thirds of the draft. Let’s take a look at those to see what they tell us about moving up (or scoring an extra pick) in the later stages of round one.

Picks in the teens

Another 14 trades involved picks 11 through 18 in the last 10 drafts, with a more reasonable asking price.

Again, the biggest category here was trade-ups. Six of the 14 were a team moving from a later first-rounder by either packaging picks (like Cleveland packaging 24+33+34 to get #17 and take Tyler Zeller) or combining talent with picks (like Portland sending #13 along with Jarrett Jack and Josh McRoberts to get #11).

Another common way to get a mid first rounder is by giving up a veteran role player (but he doesn’t have to be a star). The Spurs turned George Hill into #15 in 2011 to get Kawhi Leonard, and the Rockets did the same with Chase Budinger last season.

Finally, you can find a team that is trying to clear room by dumping picks. In the frenzy created by the 2010 free agent class, Miami and Chicago gave up the 17^th and 18^th picks to teams willing to help them clear the decks and take on Daequan Cook (OKC) and Kirk Hinrich (WAS). The 2013 equivalent of these moves might be the Dallas Mavericks giving up #13 if someone will clear Shawn Marion or Vince Carter off their books so they can go shopping this summer.

Late First Round

The most common draft pick trades involve the last third of the first round. They’re also the cheapest.

Half of the picks acquired in the last 10 drafts (26 of 53) were in this range, and the price was almost always a future pick, throwing in a second-rounder, or even just cold hard cash. In all but five of these 26 trades, that was all it cost to sneak into the late first round.

The other five were a mixed bag. Houston threw in Brad Miller with three picks in their pursuit of 2011 #20, but they also got Johnny Flynn and a future 2^nd back. New York threw in an aging-but-effective Kurt Thomas to get a late pick they turned into Nate Robinson in 2005. Boston needed to take back a retired Brian Grant in 2006 to turn their future 1^st into #21 (Rajon Rondo). And Denver got the 26^th pick in 2011 simply by “downgrading” at the point from Raymond Felton to Andre Miller.

Summary

Do the Jazz need a top 10 pick pick to add a PG to their core of four? Unfortunately, they can’t add one without breaking up the same core, we found out in the main part of this study. We’ve also learned that mid first-rounders can be had for a variety of prices and that the latest picks can be had for for cash, second-rounders, future picks or a nice box of chocolates.

Basically, if the Jazz are inclined to improve their draft-day situation, they’ll likely have to settle for making some mid first-round noise or picking up an extra late pick. Looking for a franchise savior? It better be the draft steal variety.

In Draft

John Stockton Was Really, Really Good

David J Smith — June 5, 2013 — 14 Comments

Within a matter of days, the NBA saw two all-time greats ride off into the sunset. After tremendous careers spanning parts of three decades, Grant Hill and Jason Kidd announced their retirements. The praise for their distinguished achievements that has since ensued is very fitting and deserving. The news has spawned debate as to where this pair fits in the annals of NBA lore.

Specifically, in the case of Kidd, it has lead to discussion of the best point guards in NBA history and where he fits in the pecking order. Seeing the barrage of tweets and articles that highlight Kidd’s career was enjoyable, but the Jazz devotee in me naturally gravitated to one Mr. John Stockton and his greatness.

Several have asked who had the better career: Kidd or Stockton? I won’t go too in-depth on this, as that is a topic for another day. Suffice it to say, that while Kidd has the edge in some areas (better rebounder, stronger defender, earned a championship with Dallas), Stockton has my vote due to his own advantage in others (all-time leader in two major statistical categories, durability, better shooter).

Even the most die-hard of Jazz fans can sometimes underestimate just how good Stockton was. If you will indulge me, I would like add another perspective on his place amongst his fellow elite point guards.

First, we know most of the following statistics and accolades by heart:

The all-time leader with 15,806 dimes. Led the league in assists nine consecutive seasons. Tallied 1,000+ assist seasons.
With 3,265 steals, also the all-time leader in thefts.
10-time All-Star. Co-All-Star MVP in 1993.
11-time All-NBA selection. Five-time All-Defensive team member.
Two-time Olympic gold medal winner.
Led the Utah Jazz to the playoffs each of his 19 seasons, including two Finals appearances in 1997 and 1998.
Played every game in 17 of his 19 campaigns. Including 182 postseason outings, #12 played in 1,686 of 1,708 possible games (98.7%).
Apparently one autobiography.
And so on and so on.

Well, here is one more statistic that illustrates Stockton’s mastery: points accounted for. I remember fondly many instances where John Stockton would orchestrate a brilliant quarter where he either scored or assisted nearly every basket for the Jazz. He essentially accounted for almost every point for his squad. This was a rather common occurrence, and one way in which he could quietly dominate.

The formula is simple: (assists x 2) + points scored. Obviously, we cannot accurately ascertain how many of a player’s assists resulted in three-pointers by teammates, but we can figure out the minimum points an individual accounted for during his career.

Along with the 15,806 assists, Stockton scored 19,711 points (which might be a surprising total: he was a very underrated shooter and scorer). While we cannot gauge how many three-pointers John assisted via the likes of Jeff Hornacek, Bryon Russell, and Darrell Griffith, we know that Stockton accounted for at least 51,323 points. Astounding.

Let’s compare him against some of the game’s best playmakers:

Name	Games played	Assists	Points Scored	Pts Accounted For
John Stockton	1,504	15,806	19,711	51,323
Oscar Robertson	1,040	9,887	26,710	46,484
Jason Kidd	1,391	12,091	17,529	41,711
Gary Payton	1,335	8,966	21,813	39,745
Magic Johnson	906	10,141	17,707	37,989
Steve Nash	1,202	10,249	17,285	37,783
Isiah Thomas	979	9,061	18,822	36,944
Andre Miller	1,126	7,956	15,496	31,348
Bob Cousy	924	6,955	16,960	30,950

These are some impressive numbers by some very impressive players, but Stockton’s total is remarkable. Obviously, his longevity and lack of missed games contributes greatly, as some counterparts accounted for more points per game played. In future posts, I will delve deeper into points accounted for, but for now, this gives you a feel for the impact Stockton had on the game. While Karl Malone and his prolific scoring earned most of the headlines, Stockton’s contributions were amazing.

In John Stockton Jason Kidd, John Stockton, Karl Malone, Magic Johnson, point guards, points accounted for

The 7 Ways Karl Malone Could Change Enes Kanter and Derrick Favors For The Better

Clint Johnson — June 5, 2013 — 13 Comments

Welcome Coach Karl! Or maybe it’s Periodic Expat Demi-coach of a Largely Undesignated Nature and Frequency Charged with Development of Players 6’8” and Taller (preferably far, far away from the press) Karl, but hey, potato, potahto, our boy’s come home!

Whatever else comes of this adventure, it is good to know Greg Miller and Karl Malone have gotten past the difficulties of the last few years. The Mailman’s estrangement from the Miller family, and consequently the much wider Jazz family, could never be acceptable to any party. He is too much a part of our team, and that team will always be a significant part of who Karl is as well. That he’s back “on the team” is good news.

The implications for the development of Derrick Favors, Enes Kanter, and possibly other Jazz players are far less simple to sum up. I love Karl Malone and always have, though that love has sometimes carried a legitimate component of frustration, resentment, and bitterness. In this, I think my feelings about Malone are shared by a large number of Jazz fans, and for good reason.

Karl Malone was a great, great player, one of the best ever. He was also sometimes erratic in attitude and speech, confrontational (including with people within his own organization), and, at times, selfish. I think Malone would readily admit to these negative marks in his past. While his glorious playing days are past, there is real question whether the same can be said of the distracting idiosyncrasies and vagaries of his personality. In turn, that forces one to wonder just what caliber of coach he can be.

I don’t think anyone can confidently answer that question—not the team CEO and Owner Greg Miller; not Jazz Head Coach, and former teammate of Malone, Tyrone Corbin (who apparently played a role in instigating the current arrangement); perhaps not even the Mailman himself. The demands on a coach are very different from those of an elite player, including in comportment and ability to communicate. How Karl Malone the player will transition to Karl Malone the coach/consultant is something I expect all Jazz fans will monitor with interest.

But with some questioning what virtues the Mailman brings to the table as a coach and already predicting a scandalous end to this experiment, I decided to share a few areas where I feel Malone really may produce tangible results in his work with the team’s young bigs.

1. Fitness and Conditioning

Malone changed the way NBA players approach fitness and conditioning, perhaps more than any other single player. He logged 53,479 minutes of regular season game play, or 891.3 hours, or 37.1 days, or roughly a month and one week straight of full court basketball against the greatest athletes in the world, full out, at all times. People still marvel at what his body was capable of enduring. That body was a product of work, and his game a product of that body. Thus, for Malone there was no separating in-game performance from training, both in-season and off-season.

In an interview with Muscle and Fitness, Malone said, “I will tell… anyone who cares to know that my conditioning in the off-season was what allowed me to play so many games, because I didn’t let my body get out of shape. It was harder than my in-season training. I knew once the season started, all I had to do was maintain. If I didn’t lift weights, I don’t think I would’ve had the career I had. Matter of fact, I know it.” But it wasn’t just about the weights. Add in running up hills with a parachute attached to your back and the other insane exercises in Malone’s repertoire, and the result is a program of self-inflicted agony greater than any basketball game could possibly match.

In his work with players, on court exercises and drills will rarely, if ever, be completely separate from fitness level. Malone will push for greater strength and speed and balance constantly, because that is the only way he knows how to approach the game. Stephen Jackson, who went on a New York hip-hop station and declared he never worked out in the off-season his whole career, would be killed by Coach Malone. Really, dead.

Assuming Favors and Kanter want to remain alive, working with Malone will provide them a constant, blunt, loud reminder that everything they do is dependent upon their bodies. Both young players have elite physical attributes, and may well be tempted to coast on those natural gifts. Not when they work with the Mailman. Physically, both Favors and Kanter are more likely to squeeze every ounce of superiority they have out of their bodies with Malone there periodically demanding that of them.

In Karl Malone Coaching, Derrick Favors, Enes Kanter, Greg Miller, Karl Malone, Player Development

Making Sense of an Unpredictable Draft

Denim Millward — June 4, 2013 — 9 Comments

Tim Brown/OregonLive

Ahh, June.

The time of year when the internet goes from reasonably inundated to super saturated with NBA mock drafts. From the most reputable sports news sources to every parent’s-basement-created blog, any website with a remote connection to Dr. Naismith’s creation churns out their best guess at which hoop prospects will be where when the 2013 NBA Draft smoke clears. After reading through the bulk of these predictions made by those who each fancy themselves as a roundball Nostradamus, one thing is crystal clear.

Prognostication is a fool’s errand.

With seemingly limitless variables and constantly changing conditions, making a correct prediction past the first handful of picks seems to be pure luck as often as not.

With this in mind, I did some digging into Utah’s draft history in an attempt to discern any possible patterns and/or tendencies not already apparent that could shed some light on who Kevin, Dennis and the gang may be leaning towards taking, and who may frighten them away.

Before we dive in, there are a few key points to keep in mind.

This article is by no means an effort to correctly predict who the Jazz will draft at picks 14 and 21. Rather, it should be viewed as a very general guide to provide insight on any non-obvious patterns or predispositions the Utah front office may have.
I’m fully aware the sample size used is quite small, and thus insufficient to draw any strong, definitive conclusions from. I felt it better to limit the picks analyzed to the 2000 NBA Draft to current, as that sample size better represented the draft decisions of the current front office structure.

With that said, here is the list of players who were analyzed for this article.

2000: DeShawn Stevenson – SG, pick 23, Washington Union HS
2001: Raul Lopez – PG pick 24, Real Madrid (Spain)
2002: Curtis Borchardt – C, pick 18 (trade w/Orlando), Stanford Jr.
2003: Sasha Pavlovic – G/F, pick 19, Buducnost Podgorica (Serbia)
2004: Kris Humhpries – PF, pick 14, Minnesota Fr.
2004: Kirk Snyder – SG, pick 16, Nevada Jr.
2005: Deron Williams – PG, pick 3, Illinois Jr.
2006: Ronnie Brewer – G, pick 14, Arkansas Jr.
2007: Morris Almond – SG, pick 25, Rice Sr.
2008: Kosta Koufos – C, pick 23, Ohio St. Fr.
2009: Eric Maynor- PG, pick 20, VCU Sr.
2010: Gordon Hayward – SF, pick 9, Butler So.
2011: Enes Kanter: – C, pick 3 Kentucky Fr.
2011: Alec Burks: – SG, pick 12 Colorado So.
2012: no 1^st round pick

Excluding 2012, when the Jazz had no 1^st round pick, the Jazz had an average draft position of 17.4. With the exception of 2005 and 2011, the Jazz were selecting players from the second and third tiers of draft prospects. Does draft pick position affect the type of player Utah is likely to draft? It appears so.

Since 2000, Utah has only selected two players who weren’t juniors or older with their eight picks outside the lottery: DeShawn Stevenson in 2000, who came straight out of high school and Kosta Koufos in 2008. On the other hand, four of the six lottery picks since 2000 have been used to select a freshman (Kris Humphries 2004, Enes Kanter 2011) or sophomores (Gordon Hayward 2009, Alec Burks 2011.) While this is a far from an ironclad correlation, it hints at a very interesting draft strategy.

With the heavy dose of upperclassmen selected outside the lottery by the Jazz, it suggests they tend to value consistency and immediate production over upside and long-term potential when selecting in the late teens or lower, a diametric opposition to the “taking a flier” approach on a raw, undeveloped prospect late in the first to which many teams subscribe. Picks within the lottery were split 4-2 between underclassmen and upperclassmen, perhaps indicating some preference towards younger prospects in the early stages of the draft.

Another interesting but more obvious draft trend is Utah’s aversion to drafting players with character issues, a hallmark of the Jerry Sloan regime if there ever was one. Aside from Deron Williams, who is a pretty unique case, the one first-round pick that turned out to be any kind of a malcontent, Kirk Snyder, was jettisoned to New Orleans after a single year with the Jazz. The merits of seemingly automatically excluding anyone with widely known personality red flags can be debated, but Utah’s hardline stance on avoiding these players helps to thin the field of potential Utah Jazz draftees in 2013.

If we combine all of the apparent trends observed from the previous 12 drafts (excluding 2012), we can make some educated guesses of what direction the Jazz will go at pick 14 and pick 21 in the upcoming draft.

Clearly, Utah’s biggest need is at the point guard position, so it stands to reason point guard is where the Jazz will look to go with pick 14. Michigan product Trey Burke is all but certain to be off the board by then, which leaves Michael Carter-Williams (sophomore) and Dennis Schroeder (19 year old German) as the likely candidates to be chosen. Shane Larkin (sophomore) is also a possibility here, but a remote one due to concerns about his size and length.

If either Carter-Williams or Schroeder are on the board for the Jazz’s lottery pick, but not both, I think the Jazz happily scoop up whichever player remains. In the unlikely event Utah has the choice between the two, I would give the slight edge to Schroeder due to his nearly-unparalleled quickness, great length and age (Schroeder is 2 years younger than Carter-Williams).

At 21, Utah should be comfortable selecting Larkin if they didn’t come away with a point guard at 14. If they nab a point guard with their first pick, a big man seems to make the most sense. Mason Plumlee or Kelly Olynyk would fit Utah’s history at picking older players after the lottery, but most mocks have those players being drafted before the 21st selection. In that case, the Jazz may have to go for an unproven longshot such as Rudy Gobert, the 20 year old Frenchman with the 9’7” standing reach. It’s possible the Jazz could kick the tires on Shabazz Muhammad at #21 if he falls that far, but the aforementioned character flaw aversion makes Muhammad being drafted by the Jazz a remote possibility.

If I was forced to make a prediction, I would say the Jazz come away from the draft with Schroeder and Gobert. I would also feel about 3.7% confident in that prediction, as it would only take one of many variables to change for the entire draft order to go up in smoke, taking my feeble prediction with it. This was an interesting exercise in pattern recognition, not an attempt accurately predict the future.

After all, prognostication is a fool’s errand.

In Draft Dennis Lindsey, dennis schroeder, Kevin O'Connor, Michael Carter-Williams, Rudy Gobert

Jerry Sloan: Unexpected Piece of Jazz’s Puzzle?

Andy Larsen — June 3, 2013 — 10 Comments

Jerry Sloan and Ty Corbin (center) sit together at the Chicago NBA Draft Combine. Photo Credit: AllThatAmar

Late last night, Jody Genessy released this report that the Utah Jazz have talked to former head coach Jerry Sloan about returning to the club. There’s still much we don’t know: we don’t know if the interest is mutual (though Jerry telling a newspaper reporter about it is a good sign), and we don’t know the position that was discussed (though the departure of Hornacek means there’s an obvious vacancy in an assistant’s spot on the bench). But Jerry’s constant presence as a season ticket holder last year, then his work with the Jazz at the NBA draft combine in Chicago, and now this report indicates a trend of increasing involvement for the Hall Of Fame coach and his former franchise.

After attending the NBA draft combine in Chicago, and witnessing Sloan’s involvement first hand, Mychal Lowman posted his theory: that Sloan was coming back to the Jazz to become Ty Corbin’s assistant. Just as former Coach-of-the-Year winner Phil Johnson’s worked as Sloan’s right-hand man as Sloan grew to become the HOF coach, Sloan would work as Corbin’s mentor, helping his former player and assistant reach his full potential as a head coach. At the combine, Sloan was spotted sitting right next to Corbin, and Corbin worked more closely with Sloan than with anyone else on the staff, including Kevin O’Connor, Dennis Lindsey, or scout Walt Perrin. Also accurately pointed out by Lowman: given the Jazz’s steadfast insistence on secrecy, Sloan’s involvement suggests that he isn’t about to join another franchise.

What would Sloan’s assistantship tenure look like? Despite his old-school reputation and playing career, in which he was far more impactful defensively than offensively, Sloan’s coaching expertise has been on the offensive side of the ball. Sloan led two different teams to league-leading offensive performances: in 1997-98, the Jazz put up a 112.7 Offensive Rating with Stockton and Malone at the helm (a performance that Dean Oliver selected as the 3rd best offense in league history in his book Basketball on Paper), and in 2007-08, when he led the Williams/Boozer/Okur Jazz team to a 113.8 Offensive Rating, better than even the Phoenix offensive juggernaut. That being said, it’s possible that his best accomplishment was leading a team with Andrei Kirilenko, Greg Ostertag, Raja Bell, Carlos Arroyo, and Jarron Collins as playing time leaders to offensive respectability in 2003-04. He’s also shown an remarkable ability to adapt his offense system: the pick-and-roll attack of Stockton-and-Malone is legendary, but he eschewed that system in favor of the flex for the Williams/Boozer years.

That all being said, the Jazz’s main problem last year was defense, ranking just 21st in the league. On the Salt City Hoops Saturday Show, I advocated for a defensive assistant coach like Scott Skiles or someone of his ilk to join the Jazz, after all, that’s where the most improvement is to be made. But depending on which players return for the Jazz next year, an offensive coach may actually be more needed. Consider: last season, when Al Jefferson was not on the floor, the Jazz played excellent defense, to the tune of a 100.8 Defensive Rating. That total, if continued for the whole season, would have made the Jazz the third best defense in the league, just behind the Indiana Pacers and Memphis Grizzlies. Should Jefferson not return to the Jazz next season, the Jazz’ defensive woes may already be solved.

That leaves the offensive end of the floor as the source of potential improvement. Though the Jazz’s offensive reliance on Al Jefferson was drastically overstated last season (the Jazz were just 0.3 points per 100 possessions better offensively with Al on the floor, after being 10.4 points better with him in 2011-12), the boogeyman of poor bench offensive performance may disappear should Sloan return as an assistant. Given his well-deserved reputation for getting the most on offense out of his players, Corbin may feel more comfortable going to his defensively excellent bench with Sloan around. A defensive unit featuring Hayward, Favors, and Kanter; an offensive system built by Sloan, and Corbin’s excellent team-building skills may just be the Jazz’s ingredients to future greatness.

Of course, with so many hypotheticals, it’s far too early to predict the Jazz’s return to relevancy this upcoming season. But should the pieces fit together like this, the future looks really bright. Coach Sloan, your move.

In Coaching jerry sloan and ty corbin, jerry sloan return to jazz, jerry sloan utah jazz

Operation Point Guard

Laura Thompson — June 1, 2013 — 18 Comments

When Mo Williams started off last season chucking up a shot pretty much every chance he got, I knew it was going to be a long season. In the first five games, he averaged 15.4 FGA per game, second-highest on the team at that point, and the Jazz were 2-3. As much as I liked Mo off the bench his rookie year, and as hopeful as I was that he’d be an asset to a team that desperately needed 3-point shooting and speed during his second stint with the Jazz, his tendency to look for his own shot and play hero ball didn’t mesh with a team heavy on talented, post-up bigs.

Fast forward to this offseason, which is one of the more pivotal offseasons for the Jazz in recent memory. No point guard is under contract for next year, and though last year’s PGs include a good passer (Tinsley), a tough defender (Watson), and a decent scorer (Williams), none of them inspire much excitement in the fan base should they return. They’re not the best options for moving forward and taking a talented—but still raw and improving—core to the next level. So what should be the plan?

Here’s my plan for shoring up the point guard position along with my reasoning for each point (pun intended):

1. Sign Jose Calderon to a two-year $20 million contract.

2. Draft Dennis Schroeder at #14.

3. Draft another PG.

4. Give the young kids significant playing time.

Point 1. Why Calderon? Who else of the available point guards would be either a) the point guard of the future and worth putting big bucks into, or b) willing to be a stop-gap solution until we can sign, trade for, or groom the point guard of the future? As thrilling as it would be to see Chris Paul in a Jazz uniform, that’s not going to happen—though recent events give us a glimmer of hope. Jeff Teague would cost more than I’d be willing to pay to pry him away from Atlanta: he’s a restricted free agent and they have plenty of money to match. With the amount the Jazz would have to pay to get him, they’d be banking that he’d be our point guard of the future. I don’t see that happening.

Calderon is next on the list. His defense is poor which is, unfortunately, also one of the knocks on Mo. Point guards lit us up last year, and it’ll be hard to watch that happen again for the next year or two. But assuming Kanter, Favors, Hayward, and Burks get significantly more burn this year than last, there will be very good defenders behind Calderon to compensate for his defensive deficiencies. The main benefit to signing Calderon would be that he’s a true pass-first point guard. That’s exactly what Favors, Kanter, Hayward, and Burks need in order to develop, along with increased playing time. Calderon, before the trade to Detroit, won the starting position over Kyle Lowry—who wasn’t making his teammates better—because Calderon did make his teammates better. A true point guard could do wonders for our young core.

Calderon likely wouldn’t demand more than a two-year contract given the market and his age, while allowing the Jazz to keep financial flexibility moving forward: the big-money extensions won’t kick in until the 2014-2015 season for Hayward and Favors. If Calderon doesn’t work out after this season, he’s an expiring contract the next and could be used in a trade.

Point 2. Draft Dennis Schroeder. He measured 6’2’’ in shoes with a 6’7” (!) wingspan. He’s very athletic, plays defense, has a pretty good shot, can get into the lane, and passes well. When asked about his strengths, the first thing he said was that he plays good defense, and the second was that he sets up teammates. Those are two things we need the most from the PG position. His athletic ability and wingspan will only help him improve defensively his first few years in the league, and his defense, combined with Calderon’s tutelage as a pass-first point guard, could make Schroeder a pretty good point guard. He could come along slowly while Calderon takes the bulk of the PG minutes. If Schroeder’s ready to take over starting point guard duties at the end of Calderon’s contract, great! If not, skip to Point 4.

Point 3. Pick another PG in the draft. I don’t see another point guard I’d desperately want at #21—I don’t want Shane Larkin because his defense is poor, he’s short and doesn’t have length—so take the BPA there and use the second-round pick on someone like Nate Wolters, Phil Pressey or Myck Kabongo (unlikely where we are in the second round, but possible if we get another pick somewhere). The Jazz like to carry three point guards, and having another young point to learn under Calderon could be a good thing.

Point 4. (Not to be confused with Derek Fisher.) Let the young kids play. Turn the team over to Hayward, Favors, Kanter, and Burks. There will be some rough times. But they may also surprise us. The thing about these guys is they’re all at least good defenders, which can’t be said for the veterans they’re replacing. The offensive game will come along for them; we saw flashes from each of them this last season. If they do surprise us and we make the playoffs, great! If not, we’ll have a better idea of where we are, what holes we need to fill, and we’ll end up with a lottery pick in a stacked draft. The point guard of the future could be there.

This isn’t a fool-proof plan—it requires making assumptions. But it’s a plan that could work and keeps the financial flexibility intact, which is very important to the organization and to building a championship contender. The next month will be very telling.

In Utah Jazz dennis schroeder, jazz offseason plan, NBA Draft, point guard, utah jazz point guards