Rebuttal to Hollinger’s Blasting of the “All-in-er” Jazz

The Athletic’s John Hollinger posits that reuniting Favors and Gobert cost Utah its best chance to make upgrades elsewhere. Mark Russell Pereira responds to that and other critiques by the analytics pioneer and former front office exec. (Scott Cunningham via espn.com)

John Hollinger is a really smart guy. The University of Virginia grad (good school!) is a basketball analytics pioneer, renowned inventor of Player Efficiency Rating (PER), a MIT Sloan Sports Analytics Conference mainstay, and turned his work in journalism and basketball analysis into a stint as an executive with the Memphis Grizzlies.

So when Hollinger penned several negative notes and critiques of the Utah Jazz in his 2020-2021 preview article for The Athletic, you’ll have to excuse me for not initially buying into the vitriol from Jazzland before I had a chance to read it. Look, Jazz fans have a reputation as one of the more… thin-skinned… fanbases in the NBA. Whatever predicates that reputation—maybe it’s because they are especially educated sports fans¹—doesn’t matter so much as that the reputation exists at all. So I’m going to assume the side of the neutral experts when these boiling reactions start rolling across my Twitter timeline.

And then I read the piece.

It was supposed to be an all-in year, but it ended in the same exact place as the last several Utah seasons.

[…]

I don’t think the big-picture view would have shifted much [if Utah beat the Denver Nuggets in the first round]. Utah was a good team that rewired itself in an effort to move up a level and failed.

I’d like to think a “big-picture view” takes into account all reasonably plausible outcomes, and not be reduced to a specific conclusion without fair context. Saying the Jazz simply “failed” is an outlook more suited to an old ViewMaster reel.

Here’s your missing context: that “rewiring” was indisputably successful when the key conduits—Mike Conley Jr. and Bojan Bogdanovic—were available. It is unfairly reductive to render the season a complete failure after Bogdanovic missed the playoffs to repair a ruptured ligament in his shooting wrist, and Conley missed 25+ regular season games, plus two more in the Denver series.

The Jazz pushed their asset chips in…

I know using poker tropes is common parlance when discussing NBA deals, but the Jazz have plenty of assets remaining.

…trading two firsts for Conley, signing Bojan Bogdanovic to an expensive contract…

I’m taking the word “expensive” as an implication that it’s a bad deal—especially since Hollinger called the contract an overpay last offseason and wrote that Utah will “hate (the deal) in a couple years”—so let’s examine the market. Bogdanovic made $17 million last year and will make $18.275 million in 2020-21. In comparison, in this most recent offseason, free agents Danilo Gallinari ($20.5 million annually) and Jerami Grant ($20 million) signed more lucrative deals, and Marcus Morris ($16 million), Davis Bertans ($16 million), and Malik Beasley ($15 million) came in under. It’s decent money for Bogdanovic, to be sure, but he averaged a very efficient 20.2 points per game and didn’t falter as a defender, all while playing through an injury. Bogdanovic is better than any of the aforementioned players (I’ll entertain arguments about the silky offense/bullshit foul drawing ability of Gallinari, but, even after accounting for Bogdanovic’s relative limitations on defense, there remains a chasm between the two on that end of the court) and his contract is looking like a very decent piece of business for the Jazz.

In retrospect, they could have signed another perimeter player instead of [Ed] Davis, as Tony Bradley earned the backup center spot anyway.

“Earned” is not exactly what I’d say about Bradley’s role as the backup center, because he was not good! “Less bad than 2019-20 Ed Davis” is not an accomplishment.

Without Derrick Favors, Utah knew it would absolutely bleed without a stabilizing force in the middle when Rudy Gobert was on the bench. Utah also knew that Bradley wasn’t likely to be that force (they inexplicably picked up his fourth year option anyway to give him one more chance, but more on that later). So they brought in the respected and highly competent Davis.

Since Davis turned out to be terribly miscast and Utah was unfortunately right about Bradley, the Jazz got trucked whenever Gobert sat, and no alternative “perimeter player” would have helped that. Sure, we all saw way more Emmanuel Mudiay than we anticipated, but Utah wasn’t expecting Conley to be out for dozens of games, and Dante Exum was still injured and bad at point guard things. Using the $4.7M Room Mid-Level Exception on an Avery Bradley-type guy (Bradley was also bad for a few years at that point, but was seemingly re-energized by playing with LeBron James) wasn’t going to fix the issue of “opponent benches will relentlessly score on Utah if Tony Bradley is required to have any responsibility.” 

Instead, the bench dragged them down all season, most notably in the playoffs when Bogdanovic was out.

Ah, there’s the context!

The Jazz stemmed the bleeding by trading for Jordan Clarkson, a potent sixth man who immediately helped the second unit offense recover some, but the Jazz rebuilt their entire team around offense…

It’s a gross exaggeration to say “the Jazz rebuilt their entire team around offense,” especially before the trade deadline. Getting the obvious out of the way, Conley is a plus defender. And, yes, going from the stalwart Favors to Bogdanovic in the starting lineup is a downgrade on defense. But Bogdanovic is definitely not tissue paper, and is an appropriate size for defending modern offenses. Davis was intended to supply most of what Favors could do defensively as a backup center. Finally, Gobert is a walking top-ten defense on his own (Jazz were tenth in defensive efficiency before their tanktastic, Summer League-esque bubble play-in games, per Cleaning the Glass). So, yeah, the Jazz could afford to reallocate some assets away from defense, but it’s not like they turned their entire defensive ethos upside-down with that one defensive downgrade — especially since it was also a talent upgrade and a solid overall fit.

Utah could have tried to fix the center issue at the trade deadline, but the non-Andre Drummond forward-centers who ended up being available (Willie Cauley-Stein, Dewayne Dedmon, Jordan Bell, etc.) were only barely better than Bradley or Davis defensively, or at least not so much better that the ostensible defensive benefit would be worth giving up an asset. (Not that they had any: remember, Hollinger just said they were all-in).

So while adding a score-first shooting guard is obviously a boost to the offense, Utah’s overall goal was simply to close the gap on the bench versus their opponents; it just turned out that there was more available, better talent in Clarkson than the scrap heap of so-so backup centers.

…and never quite achieved the desired result.

Ah, there the context goes again.

The defense, long the linchpin of the team, was just average…

I call “tied for 9th in defense pre-bubble” a pretty solid defense, but I am not basketball analytics pioneer.

…with a profound inability to force turnovers the biggest culprit.

The Jazz were 28th in defensive turnover percentage in 2019-20, after being 17th the year before and 5th the year before that. It can be a really noisy stat from year to year. Yes, 28th is bad and it was definitely weird at times to watch, but it’s more than fair to suggest the defense could improve its (good) ranking a few spots with a more proportionate turnover percentage.

If the Jazz were all in for 2019-20…

They weren’t.

…they went even all-in-er for 2020-21

This sentence definitely made sense.

If you’re keeping score, that’s two firsts for Conley…

The Conley trade has been litigated and relitigated over and over again, and the only consensus issue is that the Jazz might have been forced to give up Jae Crowder because they insisted on keeping Dante Exum (if Memphis even wanted Exum to begin with). Which…

…[that’s] two seconds for Clarkson…

Two seconds was the price mostly to dump Exum’s contract because Utah held on to him too long, as he was mostly bad at NBA basketball and that finally caught up with his asset value in 2019-20. Nobody’s losing sleep over those second round picks after what Clarkson provided, and by trading for Clarkson, Utah could maneuver over the cap to re-sign him.

…[that’s] two more seconds to dump backup centers and another to dump [Rayjon] Tucker.

Yeah, exercising the fourth-year option on Bradley was foolish at the time and it cost Utah a decent No. 38 pick. But making up for the bad Davis signing—again, good process in signing him with an unexpectedly bad result—is just regular NBA business to free up cash and a spot for a better player. And since Utah is going to pay the luxury tax in 2021, there’s no need to pay extra for Tucker when he was not good and the roster spot is better suited for Utah’s other youngsters. ²

So yes, they’re all-in.

In a world where the Los Angeles teams sprayed a fire hose of loosely protected first round picks and/or good players at OKC and New Orleans, Milwaukee dumped out their asset trove for Jrue Holiday, and even Michael Jordan spent nearly as much to bring Gordon Hayward to Charlotte as he did to start a brand new NASCAR team, Utah being comparably “all-in”—for the Conley trade and scraping a few second-round picks off the top to make up for marginally bad decisions—is bullshit.

Now can we talk about the way they’re all in?

At this point I would have at least enjoyed some other cursory poker or gambling puns.

Did I miss some shift in the league that put behemoth centers back into vogue and made it possible to play two of them at the same time?

Before any specifics about how/why the Jazz re-signed Favors, Hollinger immediately and incorrectly frames the Favors signing as though (a) Favors is a run-of-the-mill, replacement-level stiff, and (b) Utah is absolutely going to play Favors and Gobert at the same time as much as they did three years ago.

Despite the weaknesses shown in the previous season — a lack of ballhawks…

Add some Conley health, more difficult decisions forced by bench offenses versus Favors at the rim, and maybe some cooling of a noisy stat, and I don’t think Utah has any reason to be particularly concerned about this if they’re ninth in defense with this roster.

…and limited weapons at the backup forward spots…

What is this based on? Bogdanovic missing the entire playoffs? Bogdanovic was generally great, Joe Ingles was rock steady, Royce O’Neale matches up totally fine as a 3/4 against most starting offenses, and Georges Niang plays a fourth forward role perfectly (play hard as hell; shoot open shots and make them; play to the best of your mental ability defensively). Even Clarkson won’t kill you at a forward spot against smaller teams, if, say, Portland wants to roll out a Damian Lillard-CJ McCollum-Gary Trent Jr. lineup.

If Hollinger wanted Utah to spend money on forwards who maybe could size up defensively better against the LeBron James and Kawhi Leonard types of the league, who was available that would work? Derrick Jones Jr. could be that guy, but he got a massive role in Portland that Utah can’t offer (and he has his own limitations). Ditto for Grant, who Denver couldn’t hold onto. Toronto would match any reasonable offer for restricted free agent Chris Boucher. Justin Holiday isn’t better than Utah’s current options. The theory of Moe Harkless is better than the reality. These aren’t great players here to begin with, and do we really expect Utah to throw a fourth/fifth forward-type $8-10 million?

So if you’re not signing an actual LeBron stopper, what’s missing from this group? A forward or center with some mobility to cope with the size advantage of the Lakers/Clippers/Bucks, who provides luxury backup center defense to allow Utah’s wings to play aggressively. I wonder who fits that bill?

…Utah’s offseason entirely focused on playing musical backup centers.

Tony Bradley, Ed Davis, and Derrick freakin’ Favors are the same, you see.

The Jazz know Favors well, and their backup centers did hurt them last year.

But I thought Tony Bradley “earned” those minutes? And “did hurt them” in this sentence should mean “was the most glaring and obvious problem on the team.”

But using the full MLE to fill this spot was absurd given the size of the role.

I don’t necessarily disagree here, but “absurd” is a bit much.

Playing Favors and Gobert doesn’t work. We already saw how that movie ends.

Setting aside the fact that Favors-Gobert isn’t a pairing likely to play a ton during the season (or at least as much as previous years), this statement is also simply wrong. As Ben Dowsett helpfully researched so I didn’t have to, the Favors-Gobert pairing is plus-442 in 3188 minutes dating back to the 2015-16 season, including playoffs. A decent chunk of those minutes were played with the spacing-compromised Ricky Rubio. The Jazz will be better in the abstract with other players at the 4 alongside Gobert, but Hollinger reacts as if Utah signed Bismack Biyombo to play point guard. We might see Favors-Gobert a fair amount, but Utah will likely be careful about overextending the sometimes-achy Favors, and that duo will likely disappear come playoff time, unless specific matchups dictate otherwise.

You know what also “doesn’t work,” John? Asking O’Neale or Bogdanovic to guard Anthony Davis for 40 minutes. The Jazz aren’t going to dump us in a time machine to 2017 (although I am longing to see basketball in-person again); the Favors signing is clearly a luxury play to shoot for their personal best chance against the top teams of the league.

The Jazz could have easily opted for other perimeter weapons to fill out an iffy second group. Most notably, if they were getting the band back together, it sure seems like Jae Crowder would have been a better option than Favors. Maybe that option wasn’t available; we weren’t tapping Utah’s phones.

Crowder doesn’t solve the problem of the no-Gobert minutes, and so Utah would have to pay more money (plus luxury tax) to get some guy at the minimum or the Bi-Annual exception to hopefully not be terrible at the backup 5. Or, Utah could go with the known quantity in Favors. I would have been supportive of trying forward-center JaMychal Green (2 years, ~$15 million with Denver), which would have left a tiny bit more room with the MLE to get a true backup center to fill that need. But why have two lesser players whose salary equal one better one?

But free agency wasn’t Utah’s only play; they also could have used Davis’ and Bradley’s contracts in a trade for a similar-salaried player instead of merely paying other teams with draft picks to take them.

Again, who? We weren’t tapping any phones here, but who are good examples of useful players the Jazz could have gotten in exchange for Davis and Bradley? We know already that moving off of those two cost the Jazz second-rounders. If Utah were to expect a positive player in return that actually helps, that would require even more compensation—maybe even a first round pick. Maybe we could say Utah would be all-in at that point, but apparently they’re already all-in-er.

Meanwhile, the extension for Mitchell was an own goal of sorts as well. Utah completely capitulated on the most important part — a fifth-year player option for Mitchell that starts the clock on any potential exit a year early. In a small market, you can’t surrender rights to players that easily.

Calling the Mitchell extension negotiations an “own goal” and something for which Utah “completely capitulated” makes it sound like Utah shot themselves in the face as if they they traded a first round pick for Jeff Green. Completely misreading a free agent market for a player, getting totally worked over in a trade, or messing up basic machinations of the CBA are examples I would call “own goals.” Giving some concessions to get a signature from a rising star is just making an uncomfortable bet for the future, not some hat-in-hand surrender.

It is very fair to criticize the Jazz around the edges for the offseason, and Hollinger wasn’t the only national guy with concerns. Danny Leroux gave the Jazz a D+ in his offseason grades (he and podcast host Nate Duncan use a “C” as average). We don’t know the breaking point in negotiations for Clarkson and Favors where they lose out on those guys, but Utah paid starter-level money for two players who won’t close most games if everyone is healthy. Player options for both players are also extremely risky, and not typically given to players of their caliber. And as much as I would like to start the groundbreaking for a Mitchell statue, giving him both (a) supermax-level raises if he reaches certain performance criteria and (b) the player option in his extension deal is simply an above-market deal for an All-Star who isn’t All-NBA (yet). Add in some very mild draft pick dumps to offload salary, and you’re left with an offseason that’s… fine… but not impressive or laudatory.

A late save helped, however. [Shaq] Harrison’s addition on a non-guaranteed minimum gives the Jazz another perimeter defender, something they had sorely needed, and his contract is a bargain.

I like Harrison and he’ll be best suited as a guy to throw at a hot shooter or great player to give Mitchell, Conley, and/or O’Neale a break in the regular season. But let’s not overstate what he purports to be: a 9th/10th/11th man who will also rack up his fair share of DNPs.

The players in a nutshell

Miye Oni, SG: Couldn’t get into Virginia so he settled for Yale.

via GIPHY

Hollinger could have referenced that Oni will probably get some rotation minutes here and there as a possible budding wing defender and shooter, but I’m glad we got some “Ryan Fitzpatrick went to Harvard”-level hucks out of this preview.

There is one scenario where Utah’s offseason makes some sense, and that’s if Favors and [Udoka] Azubuike were brought in to protect the Jazz’s flank in case Gobert departs.

This should instead read: “Utah went above-market to bring in a starting-quality center to back up Rudy Gobert, but there is a chance that Favors could be worth every penny if Gobert leaves next year.” Instead, the entire offseason only makes sense for this one circumstance.

Gobert’s projected BORD$ value…

Hollinger’s new ratings, BORG and BORD$, stand for “Big Ol’ Rating” and “Big Ol’ Rating Dollars.”

I was driving in a particularly deserted area of eastern Colorado a while back and the only place to eat for lunch was a Carl’s Jr. I ordered a burger without mayonnaise. They instead rang it up as “EXTRA MAYO” and I received a burger that was absolutely saturated and overflowing with white glop. “BORD$” and “BORG” are that sandwich.

…Favors is 29 going on 90…

I’m probably just being Sensitive Jazz Fan here, but the sheer volume of unexplained snark seemed way higher here than in other previews Hollinger has done. Favors has always been a touch-and-go with knees and back pain, but he’s nowhere close to washed-up.

Look, the back end of this roster isn’t good…[t]he hope in Utah is that the top-eight players are good enough that it doesn’t matter.

It is now unclear whether Hollinger thinks Shaq Harrison is good or not.

Any in-season injuries or rest situations will further expose a brutal back end of the roster.

Regardless if any of the youngest Jazzmen are ready to play real minutes, the point of (over)paying for Clarkson and Favors is that the team is now very well-prepared to survive injuries to their highest-level players. It’s a very high-level 6th through 8th player group, which most teams do not have.

It’s jarring to note that before a ball even goes up, Utah’s second-round pick might be the fourth wing in the rotation — an odd place to be for an alleged contender.

With Utah’s positional fluidity at the 2, 3, and 4, if Elijah Hughes ends up as the “fourth wing,” that means he is taking minutes from Harrison (is he good or not?), Clarkson, and Niang. That is to say, he will have earned it (not in the Tony Bradley way) and it will be a massive success.

[T]he offseason seemed more of a step backward than forward. By using their full midlevel on a player they didn’t really need…

After further thought, you’re right—Utah didn’t need to improve on Tony Bradley getting torched.

…and blowing up their draft to tweak the third-string center slot…

Again Hollinger drops a random slight with no real explanation. For Utah to draft Azubuike at No. 27, they traded back from pick 23, and then used the 38th pick from that deal to offload Bradley. It was merely a mild shuffling of draft deck chairs to draft a deep bench center with potential in the back-end of the first round, not some grand upheaval of draft assets.

…it cost them two important opportunities to upgrade their size and defensive profile on the wing.

Again, who is this reasonably available wing player Utah missed out on here? It is still not clear that this was an actual problem for the Jazz (or at least that it won’t fix itself now that they’ve addressed the issue of backup center with a defensive anchor who keeps their system the same in non-Gobert minutes).

They ended up never addressing those issues, unless the 39th pick in the draft can play like a lottery pick.

And for the third time, I am left confused as to whether or not Hollinger thinks Shaq Harrison is good .

[I]t’s hard to get excited about Utah’s prospects of moving into the conference’s top four in the standings or winning a playoff round in this deep field.

Well it will obviously be another failed season if the Jazz don’t win the title this year, but they can go all-in-er-er by trading away a few more second round draft picks!